This Commentary asks: how has the international experience with monetary policy changed over the past decade or so? It considers the consequences of the spread of inflation-control regimes worldwide in shaping where Canada goes from hereonce the current inflation-control-target agreement expires on December 31, 2011.
At the heart of all inflation-targeting (IT) regimes is the core belief that a low and stable inflation rate is a desirable goal. The fact that the public can be convinced of the desirability of such a goal stems in no small measure from the emergence of a consensus about the appropriate social utility function that ought to govern a central bank's actions.
Inflation targeting has spread around the world. There is some diversity in what is targeted, how this is accomplished, and over what time-horizon the chosen objective is to be attained. The likely source of IT's success is that this strategy is better able to anchor inflationary expectations, and delivers the appropriate stance of monetary policy in a more consistent manner. The paper points to the need to deal explicitly with some questions about the Canadian economy's performance under inflation targeting, especially in light of the large shocks that have hit our economy in recent years. For example, the Bank of Canada could be more explicit about how it might pre-empt the consequences of stresses in the economy and the financial system to avoid the accusation that it is an effective enabler of asset price bubbles. Accordingly, this is a good time to reconsider the regime's configuration. The principal lesson is that the Bank must take careful account of the international environment in which it has been and will be operating. The Bank's failure to emphasize international matters in 2006, when it set out its remit for reviewing the program, was a serious omission.
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The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution. The Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by policy staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute's individual and corporate members are drawn from business, universities and the professions across the country. T his Commentary focuses on two interrelated issues. First, how has the international experience with monetary policy changed over the past decade or so? It considers the consequences of the spread of inflation-control regimes worldwide in shaping where Canada goes from here once the current inflation-control-target agreement expires on December 31, 2011. What does this portend for the conduct of monetary policy in Canada? Second, as the date for the renewal of Canada's inflation targeting regime approaches, what elements of the existing policy regime deserve attention?
In particular, policy questions that may have been overlooked, based on an assessment of the international experience, will be addressed. The objective, of course, is to evaluate and, if necessary, to improve how well the current monetary policy strategy is able to not only deliver low and stable inflation, but to buttress itself against the potential criticism that, in the face of recent shocks and crises in the world economy, more wholesale change to Canada's regime is required.
There is a sense in which policymakers in Canada can be accused of complacency about the potential threats from abroad, and possibly from within, that could threaten the survival of the monetary policy regime in its present form. Lulled into the belief that it is enough to have a coherent but domestically oriented monetary policy regime, and focused on an explicit inflation-control target and a floating exchange rate, they may not adequately take into account external pressures. For example, the history of the Canadian dollar, ably documented by Powell (1999) , suggests that, while policymakers at home have historically preferred a floating exchange rate regime, events beyond their control have on several occasions forced our country away from the free float only to return to it, often when the international cooperation or coordination required to make alternative monetary regimes function, breaks down. 1 Since Canada is on the periphery of economies that will dictate the make-up and structure of future international monetary relations, the prospect of deciding what happens after 2011 gives Canada's policymakers the opportunity not only to take a look back but to improve on a policy that, since 1991, has consistently delivered lower average inflation than in the US or the euro area. They should not shy away from more prominently defending its virtues on the world stage, or considering potential avenues for improvement, lest it is trampled by an imminent desire on the part of major economic powers to construct a new international monetary order not entirely suited to Canada's economic needs. 2 As this is written, the financial shock that originated in the US, and spread worldwide, has prompted renewed calls for greater policy cooperation, if not coordination, seemingly oblivious to the mechanisms that currently exist among central banks, in particular, to carry out necessary interventions. 3
The Current Environment
In 2009, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand celebrates 20 years of inflation targeting (hereafter IT). Canada's turn comes in 2011. The record of inflation in Canada over the past decade relative to the US experience is impressive, as seen in Figure 1 . With very few exceptions, Canada's inflation rate has been below that of the US since 1991, when IT was introduced. Indeed, the cumulative inflation advantage Canada has enjoyed over the US, between the second quarter of 1991 and the end of 2007, is almost 45 percent; not an insignificant figure. 4 
The Remarkable Story of Canadian Inflation
Figure 2 plots inflation objectives in Canada, alongside a selection of inflation forecasts, since 1991 when IT was introduced. For the most part, expectations of inflation have remained inside the target bands, especially since 1995 when the 1-3 percent corridor was established and thereafter left untouched. Moreover, whenever a forecast breached the target, it did not take long before expectations returned inside the target range. In addition, long-term inflationary expectations, as proxied by the difference between the yields on long-term government bonds and on inflationindexed government bonds, have remained well within the inflation-control objectives since 1997. Notice, however, that there continues to be some disagreement about inflationary expectations throughout the period examined. Less celebrated perhaps has been the durability of the regime, particularly as policy regimes that preceded IT since World War II showed themselves unable to match its success in this regard.
Since 1989, when inflation reduction targets were introduced in New Zealand, this type of policy framework has spread throughout the world. There are now almost 30 countries that target inflation in a more or less formal fashion. 5 Several other central banks, most notably the United States, Switzerland, and the euro area are considered to be de facto adherents to a policy of IT. It is also the case (see Appendix A) that the degree of economic and political independence of central banks in IT economies is significantly higher than in economies that have chosen not to adopt this kind of monetary policy strategy. This reflects a political decision in these countries to provide the means for their central banks to do what central banks have claimed all along to be designed to do, namely fight inflation (Siklos 2002) .
There are a number of remarkable features about how this state of affairs has emerged over time. The adoption of IT was not normally the consequence of some economic or financial crisis in the countries that, early on, chose to adopt this strategy, although, in some instances, a crisis did help to motivate policymakers to consider the adoption of an explicit inflation objective. 6 Repeated banking crises in earlier decades led to the creation of the Basel Committee, and greater A few countries, including Canada, subsequently adopted a monetary target, but ex post this proved to be a brief interlude on the road to the current IT monetary policy strategy. 9 Other countries, most notably in Europe, were still clinging to a form of exchange rate pegging to carry them through to eventual monetary union and the creation of a single currency, the euro.
Throughout this period, as is now well known, macroeconomic conditions were dismal with high inflation and poor economic growth the norm in much of the world. The fear of a return to higher inflation, combined with a slowing economy, remains a possibility. At the very least, a milder version of the 1970s style stagflation may well be in the offing. 10 Even if worries over inflation are now being replaced with fears of the onset of deflation, 11 due to sharply lower commodity prices and a global recession, one should be reminded of the link between the ongoing credit crunch and the resulting supply-side effects. This scenario is also one that can lead to higher, not lower, inflation (Blinder 1987 Dincer and Eichengreen's (2007) index of transparency (not shown) reveals that four of eight IT countries in the industrial world are considerably more transparent than industrial countries that do not explicitly target inflation. Indeed, only the USA and the euro area come close to being as transparent as those economies with quantified objectives. In contrast, transparency among emerging market economies' central banks is considerably lower than at counterpart central banks in the industrial world.
There also exist differences in the manner in which the targets are implemented, understood, and how credible they are, features of the IT strategy that continue to be downplayed. Only some of the salient ones are mentioned here. 12 Perhaps the least appreciated feature of such regimes, at least from a global perspective, is the distinction between inflation reduction and inflation-control targets. All industrial countries have operated under unchanging inflation objectives for several years. In contrast, in only roughly half of emerging market economies with quantitative inflation objectives have the target ranges remained fixed for two years or more (also see Siklos 2008a) . Some central banks are required to keep inflation within a target range, others must meet a single numerical objective. Still others view the target as a medium-term objective to be met over some ill-defined cycle with minimal, if any, requirements to justify breaches in the inflation objective.
Most central banks target a headline rate of inflation, as measured by consumer prices, although several central banks set their sights on core inflation, or a version of core inflation that excludes certain especially volatile items in a broader price index. One powerful theoretical argument favouring reliance on core inflation is that a credible central bank can then ignore drifts in the price level that are unlikely to be permanently reflected in headline inflation. However, other than the measurement issues involved, and the complex task of distinguishing transitory from permanent shocks affecting inflation, this solution does not deal with the fact that the public is not only more likely to follow movements in headline inflation but ultimately cares primarily about this measure of loss in purchasing power. After all, wages and the real return of financial assets are evaluated on the basis of headline inflation.
Focussing on core rather than headline inflation can be problematic for another reason: the relative importance of volatile elements in headline CPI measures vary considerably around the world.
Whereas central banks in the industrial world may arguably be in a better position to explain the relevance of core indicators of inflationary pressures since, for example, food and energy prices represent a somewhat smaller proportion of the overall index, the same is not true for emerging markets economies that are attempting to emulate an IT strategy.
The formality of the IT regime can also vary widely. In some countries, there is legislation that outlines the obligations of both parties to the agreement to target inflation (e.g., as in New Zealand), in others there exists an understanding, not legislated, between the Governor of the central bank and the Minister of Finance about what range of inflation rates is desirable (e.g., as in Australia and Canada). However, observers should not harbour the illusion that politics has anywhere been removed from deciding the remit of a central bank. Ultimately, any monetary policy is dictated by the wishes of a particular government and legislature.
In a few instances, the central bank decides the appropriate inflation objective that is expected to be met over time (e.g., the European Central Bank). While IT may well have created a 'virtuous feedback loop,' with lower and more stable inflation underwritten by the political authorities, this attitude is less well entrenched in nonindustrial economies with explicit inflationcontrol objectives. Several countries, including IT countries in the industrial world, have adopted fiscal rules to constrain the ease with which a deficit, especially of the politically motivated variety, can re-emerge. Nevertheless, it is unclear how binding existing fiscal commitments are, especially as the world economy endures a period of economic stress. For example, Europe's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has already been watered down, or is not taken sufficiently seriously (e.g., see Annett, Decressin, and Deppler 2005 , and references therein).
In addition, there exist differences in the degree to which central banks are committed to a floating exchange rate, thought by some to be the sine qua Still, at the heart of all IT regimes is the core belief that low and stable inflation rates represent a goal that society ought to aspire to. The fact that policymakers and, ultimately, the public can be convinced of the desirability of such a goal stems in no small measure from the emergence of a consensus about the appropriate social utility function that ought to govern a central bank's actions. 14 Simply stated, it was deemed optimal to conduct policy in such a manner as to minimize the variance of inflation and real GDP growth. Eventually, the trade-off between the two, and the policies required to minimize them, became enshrined in what academics and policymakers have come to accept as constituting 'best practice' in the conduct of monetary policy.
The policy has survived the onslaught of repeated banking, financial, and economic crises around the world, and has thrived in spite of, or perhaps because of, the seemingly relentless forces of globalization. Even so, whereas academic research has clearly demonstrated that IT has served us well, there is as yet no conclusive evidence that an explicit IT policy yields superior economic outcomes relative to a monetary policy regime that just 'does it' when it comes to controlling inflation.
The IMF (see IMF 2006) recently sought to place the IT strategy in the most favourable light possible. Yet, a cursory survey of the results of both their study and those of others employing a similar approach (e.g., Hyvonen 2004) suggests that the evidence in favour of IT is inconclusive, mainly, because the metric used to demonstrate the supposed superiority over alternative regimes is flawed, and is likely incapable of providing a definitive answer about the ability of an IT regime to deliver comparatively better inflation performance. 15 The Secret to Inflation Targeting's Success I demonstrate below that the likely source of IT's success is that this strategy is better able to anchor inflationary expectations, and delivers the appropriate stance of monetary policy in a more consistent manner.
Consider Figure 3A . I calibrate the eponymous Taylor rule (explained in Appendix B) for a group of five inflation-targeting and five non-IT economies since the early 1990s. 16 They are: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom (IT); and the euro area, the United States, Malaysia, 14 Taylor (2007) traces this development to the 1970s, when economic research had reached the point where: "…it was hard to find a paper in which the policy objective was not stated."
15 The usual approach is to estimate a regression wherein an inflation differential consisting of inflation in the targeting period less inflation during a sample when targets were not in place is regressed on, among other variables, a dummy that identifies the adoption of IT (e.g., see Ball and Sheridan 2003) . Ordinarily estimated in a cross-sectional framework, the test requires that inflation and non-IT regimes be identified. The latter group serves as a control group. In IMF (2006) the control group consists of 29 countries while the IT group consists of only 13 countries (all emerging market countries). Although there is an attempt to check for robustness there is virtually no justification offered for the selection of the control group of countries which is a veritable motley crew of countries with different monetary policy strategies (see IMF 2006, Appendix II), including some countries that would soon go on to adopt an inflation target (e.g., Turkey).
Singapore, and Switzerland (non-IT). The non-IT group comprise economies that have deliberately eschewed the IT label, have explicitly adopted exchange-rate regimes of the non-floating variety, and include some small open economies that have delivered relatively low and stable inflation rates during the period considered. Next, I consider how monetary policy is actually conducted in the two groups of economies considered here, again relative to the Taylor rule prescription shown in Figure 3A . 17 The results are shown in Figure 3B . It is clearly seen that actual policy rates in IT economies are set higher than the "standard" Taylor rule would require until about 2000 in both groups considered, but especially among the ITers. Thereafter, policy is consistently loose in the non-IT economies and, at least on average, just about right in the IT camp. Figure 3B , therefore, is another demonstration that differences exist in the actual conduct of monetary policy between IT and non-IT countries that may not be so evident if we only consider ex post inflation performance of the economies in question.
If we are prepared to assume that the non-IT group de facto behaves as if it targets inflation in the 1-3 percent range, Figure 4 reveals that breaches in the inflation target are significantly smaller among the IT group of countries. 18 In addition, the persistence in policy rate movements is generally higher in IT economies than in the non-IT economies considered, though the gap between the two groups vanishes after 2002 (results not shown). In other words, IT delivers a credibility bonus and greater predictability in nominal interest rate movements. 19 Siklos (2008a) provides further evidence on the international experience with IT. 20 First, when an inflation target is threatened, it is not necessarily the upper range of the target that is breached. Second, when breaches do occur, they are transitory. Rarely do breaches go on beyond two consecutive quarters. It should be noted, however, that since inflation target ranges tend to be more malleable outside the industrial world, the evidence on breaches in emerging market economies is likely biased by giving the impression that they are more successful than they really are. Third, breaches tend to be less variable in both the industrial and emerging market economies than in non-IT economies. Nevertheless, the record of the US, the euro area and Switzerland is comparable to that of any IT economy.
The inflation scare of early 2008 was nothing new. As recently as 2004, policymakers also worried about rising prices. Cross-sectional averages of policy rates for inflation and non-inflation targeting economies were applied to a Taylor rule of the form i t = 3.5 t + 1.5 t + 0.5y t , where i t is the (nominal) policy rate, t is the inflation gap (i.e., actual less targeted inflation, y t is the output gap (see Poole (2006) for a discussion of the choice of numerical values). Inflation targeting economies are: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK. Non-inflation targeting economies are: the euro area, the US, Malaysia, Singapore, and Switzerland. Policy rates can be obtained from the web sites of individual country central banks accessible via the Bank of International Settlements' central bank hub (http://www.bis.org). Output gaps were constructed by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter = 1600) to the logarithm of real GDP and evaluating the percent difference relative to the actual (log of ) real GDP, with the exception of Canada where its March 2008 estimate of the output gap was used (available from www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/index.html#indicators). For the inflation targets, the mid-point of target ranges over time was used. Details can be found in Siklos (2008a) . For the non-inflation targeting economies, a 2 percent target was assumed throughout. In Figure 3 , breaches were obtained by relying on the one year ahead Consensus forecast of inflation less the top or bottom of the inflation target range. For non-inflation targeting economies, a 1-3 percent target range is assumed.
~C learly, over time important differences in monetary policies emerge that may not be reflected in analyses that focus on inflation performance alone. Tests (not shown, but see the technical Appendix) reveal that business cycles are less synchronous between the non-IT economies and the US than between IT countries and the US, but only after 2003. If 'decoupling,' or, preferably, growing divergences in business cycles between these two sets of countries has emerged, it is a rather recent phenomenon. Unfortunately, these tests are not informative about the role of the IT regime per se in generating this outcome, but the results may help explain the different monetary policy stances reported above, particularly since 2004 (also see Figure 5 ). 21 Mean deviations from the rule were -0.52 percent for Canada (statistically different from zero), and -0.06 percent. for the US (not significantly different from zero).
Plus ça Change?
22 This attitude is reflected in the views of Alan Greenspan who is sceptical of a central bank's ability to pre-empt an asset price bubble but never does entirely rule out an activist policy in this regard. "But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions, as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, …But we should not underestimate, or become complacent about, the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy." (Greenspan 2007, p. 177) The Fed, under Bernanke, may well have reconsidered Greenspan's stance (Lahart 2008) .
23 See, inter alia, Borio and Lowe (2002) , Bean (2003) , Detken and Smets (2004) , and Siklos and Bohl (2008) . For an excellent overview of the case for more activist policy in the face of large asset price movements, see Roubini (2006) . 
Canadian versus US Monetary Policies
Closely related, the situation as it stood in 2006 emerged as a result of, or was prompted by, a benign worldwide macroeconomic environment, often referred to as the Great Moderation. The reduction in the volatility of inflation and output growth was nothing short of remarkable. Blanchard and Simon (2001) were among the first to bring attention to this phenomenon but their evidence only documents the facts up to the 1990s.
The foregoing developments allowed monetary policy to become expansionary (see below). Figure 7 is an attempt to explain, again relying on the Taylor rule, the evolution of the overnight rate in Canada and in the US since IT began. Depending on how one 'calibrates' the policy rule, monetary policy has, for the most part, been consistent with conditions of monetary ease since 2000 in both countries. 21 Indeed, other than in 1994, and again briefly in 2006, the stance of policy has been similar in both countries. The brief tightening in the US that began in 2006, but was quickly reversed in 2007 with the onset of the sub-prime crisis, explains the divergence in policies towards the end of the sample. On average, monetary policy has been persistently expansionary since inflation targets were introduced in Canada. This result holds even under a variety of assumptions about the evolution of potential output. The combination of a favourable external inflationary environment, together with modest threats to the underlying inflation-control target, suggests that, over the lifetime of the present regime, it may not have been sufficiently stress-tested.
Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
The current bout of financial uncertainty threatens the delicate balance between the Bank of Canada's mandate to "…mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices, and employment…" (Bank of Canada Act (1985) , Preamble, c. B-2), and the power vested in the Governor if he is "…of the opinion that there is a severe and unusual stress on the financial market or financial system…" (Bank of Canada Act (1985) , section 18, g.1). Although we may not yet know the full extent of the fallout from what began as the subprime crisis during the summer of 2007, at least Canada does not appear to share the same prospects as the US with regard to a collapsing housing price bubble, certainly in terms of magnitude.
However, as the US Federal Reserve and other major central banks, including the Bank of Canada, continue to struggle with the credit crunch, the asymmetry between the now widely accepted notion that anticipated rises in inflation should be pre-empted, while asset price bubbles should be dealt with retroactively, is glaring. 22 This, in spite of the fact that there exists considerable evidence linking rapidly rising housing and equity prices to subsequent strains in the conduct of monetary policy. 23
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Commentary 292 Indeed, the failure to pre-empt the asset price bubble associated with the high-tech sector in 1999, and current attempts to deal with the collapse of the US real estate market after the fact, have led to accusations that the manner in which central banks react to asset price movements results in overly loose monetary policy that will eventually generate high inflation. Whether rolling bubbles stem from monetary policy relaxing its emphasis on price stability remains in question. Indeed, the discussion has highlighted what used to be referred to as the limits of monetary policy, a term that is no longer frequently heard from the lips of central bankers. Policymakers are asking, once again, what role a central bank has in supervising and regulating banks and other types of financial institutions, a topic that is beyond the scope of this Commentary.
Blinder (2008) points out that no central bank has a set of instruments that can target a stock market bubble that, as in the case of the tech bubble of 2000, tends to be centered in a segment of the stock market. Bubbles that stem from irresponsible bank lending practices, however, are another matter because the central bank and bank supervisors, if they are separate institutions, do have the information and the ability to step in before the damage is done. Blinder is correct but only up to a point. More importantly, his arguments do not diminish the case for more activism by central banks in the face of run-ups in asset prices. Even if stock market bubbles are confined to a particular segment of the market, their impact spills over to other prices and other markets elsewhere. Moreover, if the existing empirical evidence suggests that equity price bubbles are economically less harmful than housing price bubbles, this does not absolve the central bank from communicating its concerns over the direction of change in selected asset prices. Using an interest rate instrument to temper stock price increases can still be the appropriate response.
The Bank of Canada, therefore, could be more explicit in stating how it might pre-empt the consequences of stresses in the economy and the financial system in particular and avoid the accusation levelled at some central banks that they are effective enablers of asset price bubbles. While this is certainly not easy, the attempt ought to be worthwhile. Filardo (2008) , for example, highlights the benefits of a more activist central bank in relation to large asset price movements. Borio and Shim (2007) also make the case that central banks can be effective in mitigating asset price movements.
Defining Price Stability
It is worth noting that the answer to the question "what is meant by the term price stability?" has been postponed since at least 1990. Former Governor John Crow attached a great deal of importance to this issue. The official announcement of what was then referred to as inflation reduction targets explicitly pointed out that Bank of Canada research "…suggests a rate of increase in consumer prices that is clearly below 2 per cent. However, a more precise definition is not specified now -in the event that further evidence and analysis relevant to this matter become available in the next few years." (Crow 2002 , p. 178) Almost two decades later, we still wait for a precise definition. The 2006 Bank of Canada background paper announcing the renewal of IT until 2011 no longer refers to a desire to define price stability the next time around the targets are slated for renewal. One possibility is that the current target of 2 percent essentially amounts to a consensus view about what price stability represents. However, a formal statement from the Bank indicating that 2 percent headline inflation is tantamount to price stability has never been forthcoming. 24 Instead, the Bank prefers to frame the question as asking "…whether the specific regime established in the 1990s will deliver the greatest contribution that monetary policy can make to economic performance and to the well-being of Canadians in the decades ahead." (Bank of Canada 2006, p. 3) . 25 Interestingly, the European Central Bank appears to have settled this issue. The definition of price stability it has set for itself is "…as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area of below 2 percent." 26
We've Seen this Movie Before Rose (2007) is one of many authors celebrating the successes of IT. In Siklos (2002) , I pointed out that IT was about to surpass the Bretton Woods system in terms of longevity. Rose's work adds formal empirical evidence as well as confirming the longevity of the IT regime. Nevertheless, there are signs that this policy is already being put to a more severe test. This has led to some prominent economists, including Joseph Stiglitz (2008) , to argue that: "Today, inflation targeting is being put to the test and it will almost certainly fail. " Friedman (2004, p. 130 ) is even more emphatic about the drawbacks of IT regimes, referring to the policy as "…a framework not for communicating the central bank's goals but for obscuring them…." He is especially critical of IT central banks' unwillingness to be explicit about output performance under various inflation projections, and about not being sufficiently open concerning the weight attached on the output gap in the conduct of policy. The first criticism is well taken though Friedman's opinion applies to fewer and fewer IT central banks. The second criticism also contains an element of truth but Friedman never explains what is gained from knowing the weight of the output gap in advance of setting the policy instrument. 27 More importantly, we are never told whether alternative monetary policy strategies can deliver better policy or economic outcomes than IT.
Threats to the Inflation-Targeting Strategy: Complacency and Political Pressure
The financial crisis that has unfolded since the summer of 2007 risks sidetracking central banks away from their principal mission for a number of different reasons. 28 First, while it is true, as Rose asserts, that no country has been forced to abandon IT, there are obvious signs of serious difficulties with the targeting regime in various parts of the world.
In the UK where IT was introduced soon after the policy was enacted in New Zealand and in Canada, the Governor, in 2008, was required for the first time since IT was introduced to explain, in a letter to the Chancellor, why the inflation target was breached and to provide an explanation and the timing of the steps that would be necessary to return inflation back to target.
In Thailand the breaching of the target in 2008, and the central bank's attempts to even modestly raise interest rates to counter inflationary pressures, led to political pressure on the Bank of Thailand (e.g., see Minder 2008) . Consider also the example of Iceland where the targets were introduced in 2001. The tolerance range was considerably wider until 2003 when the current range of +1 ½ percent was fixed. In spite of the generous margins for error, the upper range of the target was breached almost half the time since the inflation objectives were put in place (12 of 28 quarters). One culprit: the phenomenal growth in the foreign debt to GDP ratio, which led to the collapse of the currency. This raises a question that has lately often been left out of the IT debate, namely the extent to which fiscal or debt considerations can jeopardize an inflation objective.
Saunders (2008), who reviews the forces at play in the early stages of global efforts aimed at preventing a recurrence of the recent financial crisis, writes: "The idea that central banks can quietly stick to keeping inflation at bay is gone." Fortunately, some central bankers, such as Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, beg to differ: "The primary goal of a central banker and certainly of the ECB is to maintain price stability…, which is a necessary condition for financial stability, if not a sufficient condition." (Trichet 2008 ).
Will Inflation Targeting Continue to Spread?
In spite of the current Fed Chairman's sympathy towards IT, the US is no closer to adopting this type of monetary policy strategy than when Alan Greenspan stood steadfastly against adopting formal inflation targets. Similarly, there are no signs that the European Central Bank will anytime soon admit to conducting policy as if it were explicitly targeting inflation.
Moreover, as Rose's own work also make clear (also, see IMF 2006), the rising popularity of IT largely comes from its spread into emerging market economies. Not only is their historical commitment to low and stable inflation more suspect but the success of IT is frequently tinged by the not-so-infrequent resort to moving the targets. Hence, the durability of these regimes is very much open to debate. 29 Only a relatively small number of countries have stable inflation-target ranges of the kind the Bank of Canada has had to abide by since 1995. Therefore, there are plenty of reasons not to be too self-congratulatory about the wonders of an IT regime. 30 Rather than IT per se, a more important consideration is commitment to a price stability objective. In so far as an explicit inflation target facilitates the communication of how monetary policy is actually implemented, and the variables under which a monetary policy is conditioned, this type of regime ought to be preferred over ones that effectively amount to simply declaring a quantitative target only.
All Together Now?
Finally, while the floating exchange rate regime and central bank independence rule the day, a change in this policy environment is not out of the question. Indeed, several IT central banks reserve the right and continue to engage regularly in foreign exchange market intervention (see Appendix A). So-called trends in one direction can easily be reversed and there are plenty of historical precedents to draw upon that justify this position, as illustrated previously.
It was pointed out earlier that IT has enjoyed widespread appeal because of a growing consensus that price stability is a desirable objective, and that an explicit numerical inflation objective may well be a critical ingredient in credibly achieving this result. As such, policymakers around the world have independently arrived at what Taylor (2007a) refers to as a 'global cooperation policy.' This refers to the recognition, reached more or less independently by countries in several parts of the world, that 'best practice' in monetary policy involves responding to inflation and output shocks following a Taylor rule, in its classic form. Similarly, a relative newcomer to IT, Turkey, has so far yet to achieve its inflation target necessitating explanatory statements from the Governor (e.g., see the Governor's April 30, 2008 statement available at http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/eni/eng/) and a revision to its inflation-control path.
30 Hopefully, the publication of Rose's findings is not the manifestation of Goodhart's law ("Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed on it for control purposes," Goodhart (1984, p.96) . In the present context, this would seem to imply the pending unraveling of IT as a monetary policy strategy.
Indeed, empirical evidence is available to support the contention that, so long as different countries adopt a comparable monetary policy strategy, summarized by adherence to a Taylor rule, there is no particular advantage in terms of policy outcomes in separately reacting to the exchange rate. 31 The reason is straightforward. A central bank that nominally cares only about inflation and the output gap but, in practice, takes into account the conduct of monetary policy in the rest of the world, effectively acts as if it also responds to the exchange rate.
Taylor suggests that directly responding to exchange rate developments may be one of the byproducts of globalization, in so far as the latter presents a temptation to veer off course from following a policy rule that focuses on responding only to inflation and output gaps. This approach effectively leads to a deterioration of a framework that, in his opinion, has worked well for almost two decades. Interestingly, he does not invoke the role of formal IT, as practiced in countries such as Canada, except to point out that, in emerging markets where this strategy has been employed, there has been a tendency to react to exchange rate movements. 32 Apparently, this can be destabilizing.
It is important, however, to draw a distinction, not raised in Taylor (2007a) , between a central bank that explicitly pays attention to the nominal exchange rate as a complementary objective of monetary policy versus a monetary policy that recognizes that exchange rate movements may not reflect 'fundamentals' at every moment in time and, therefore, appears as if to react to the monetary policy of the centre (i.e., the US or the euro area).
Alternatively, interest rate smoothing, a widely recognized stylized fact of interest rate movements can also give the appearance of a policy reaction function that seemingly reacts to exchange rate movements. But this need not be destabilizing. Such practices are potentially destabilizing only when an explicit and direct role is given to the exchange rate in the setting of the policy rate. 33
What Role for Monetary Policy Coordination? Table 1 shows regression evidence suggesting that exchange rate considerations do matter in a wide variety of countries, whether they explicitly target inflation or not. That this feature of the data indicates a threat to good conduct in monetary policy is unclear for reasons just outlined. Of course, the foregoing deals with the first moment in exchange rate movements (i.e., the mean). There is still the open question concerning whether second moments (i.e., volatility) can indeed have a deleterious impact on economic performance. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Mishkin and Savastano (2000) , there ought to be no confusion about exchange rate considerations, so long as the primacy of the inflation objective is upheld.
Taylor's conclusions about the benefits of following a monetary policy strategy based on no more than on a common understanding of how to set the domestic policy instrument may, however, be overly optimistic for other reasons as well. Coenen et. al. (2008) demonstrate that the net benefits of a go-it-alone approach, wherein the central bank is oblivious to the policy rule of other countries, is highly sensitive to the degree of Figures 2 and 3 ) was fitted to each country's data, including the US. The difference between the two Taylor rule estimates are regressed on the US Fed funds rate (no constant term). Also, see Taylor (2007) .
openness of an economy and the degree to which the economies eyeing each other are integrated. There may well be advantages to conditioning one's monetary policy on the policy of another country, especially if it is a large trading partner. Furthermmore, the US dollar plays a dominant role in international transactions and this feature of the international economy may provide an explanation for asymmetric pass-through effects. Clearly, this issue is also relevant to the apparent success of a made-in-Canada monetary policy strategy. It is well known that while pass-through effects were weak to non-existent when the Canadian dollar was depreciating in the early years of the new century, stronger pass-through effects in the recent run-up of the currency may provide clues as to why inflationary pressures in Canada have, so far, been moderate. Exactly why these forces appear to operate differently in some countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, or even the euro area, is never actually spelled out. Therefore, despite Taylor's (2007a) contention that a commitment to low and stable inflation is enough to mitigate pass-through effects, doubts remain. It may well be sensible to appear to react to the exchange rate even as the focus remains on price stability.
Models that recognize the special role played by a dominant currency in international trade (e.g., see Golderg and Tille 2008, and references therein) imply that there are externalities resulting from how monetary policy is carried out by a dominant economy and that, under plausible conditions, substantial gains in cooperation between the center (i.e., the US) and the periphery (e.g., a small open economy such as Canada's) can be exploited. Hence, the presence of a currency with a significant international role should, in theory, influence monetary policy strategy in periphery countries. Nevertheless, the models used to address these questions are in their infancy and, so far, their ability to explain exchange rate movements, is rather limited (e.g., see Jung 2007).
What all this means is that there is no cut-anddry answer to the dilemma concerning the role of the exchange rate in a policy rule under IT. Economies that are accused by Taylor of being on the wrong path because they evince a concern for the exchange rate are in regions of the world that, at least according to some, have managed so far to avoid the repercussions of the ongoing economic trials and tribulations under way in the US. Theory has not yet sufficiently progressed to provide a clear answer about how much international monetary policy coordination is desirable. Perhaps cooperation, that is, the exchange of information and experiences, is enough. Equally important, as previously argued, the details of an IT strategy vary considerably around the world. The importance attached to price stability in Canada, together with our attachment to a freely floating exchange rate, sets us apart from many IT economies, certainly outside the industrial world but also vis-à-vis some within the group of industrialized economies. It is comforting that such policies appear to confer a "good housekeeping seal of approval" as well as finding some support in the data.
Quo Vadis?
Even if the present global financial turbulence fades away, and central banks can return to focusing primarily on the job of ensuring price stability, its repercussions have already been felt in Canada. Moreover, the return of a Democrat to the White House may very well signal economic policies that are less friendly to other countries. The question is whether central banks, especially in the industrial world, can withstand political pressure. 34 As Woolley (1984) pointed out some time ago, Arthur Burns, a predecessor of Greenspan at the US Federal Reserve, was one of the world's most respected economists but the Great Inflation of the 1970s happened anyway. Hence, central bankers cannot be entirely immune to political pressure. However, unlike the 1970s and early 1980s, their toolkit now includes more autonomy, more effective monetary policy instruments, and the fruits of more than a decade's worth of low and stable inflation. In spite of all these advances, the age old habit of politicians applying pressure on the central bank has not yet been outlawed. Nor has the conundrum been solved of what mix of interest rate changes and moral suasion is most likely to deliver the best monetary policy outcomes. An understanding of the distinction between monetary policy actions that are fundamentally credible from ones that are not continues to elude policymakers.
Large movements in the exchange rate, and the reemergence of higher inflation, fuelled largely by global considerations, will further put pressure on policymakers to eye each other's monetary policies to a greater extent than has been the case for the past decade. Since cooperation, if not coordination, in trade, banking, and financial policies, has been on the rise, at least until recently, it comes as a bit of a surprise that there have been fewer efforts to do the same in the sphere of monetary policy. While Canada's monetary policy regime has systematically delivered consistently low inflation in an era of stable economic growth this era may very well have come to an end. Accordingly, regardless of the fact that the current targeting agreement expires in 2011, this is a good time to reconsider the regime's configuration. Perhaps the principal lesson for the Bank of Canada as it does this is to take careful account of the international environment in which it has been and will be operating. The Bank's failure to emphasize international matters in 2006, when it set out its remit for reviewing the program was, in this author's view, a serious omission and it is to be hoped that they will, in fact, play an important role in its deliberations.
As this paper has argued, international considerations are relevant for two reasons. First of all, they provide a critical source of evidence on how inflation targeting functions, for the simple reason that Canada is only one of about 30 countries that have such a regime in place in one form or another. Furthermore, their configurations differ markedly across specific programs, and experience with them has also been widely varied. As we have seen, the fact that no country that has adopted inflation targeting has then abandoned the regime, save for Finland and Spain which did so upon adopting the Euro, has been widely read as a strong sign of the basic idea's strength. But as we have also seen, closer inspection of the evidence suggests that it is sometimes hard to identify specific benefits that have accrued to countries with a formal inflation targeting regime in place that were not also reaped by other countries -provided that their monetary authorities have displayed a credible commitment to price stability more generally.
Closely related, inflation targeting spread internationally during a period in which the world economy was experiencing a period of stability often referred to as the Great Moderation. Perhaps the spread of inflation targeting itself contributed to this phenomenon, but decisive empirical evidence to this effect has proved elusive, and in any event, the collapse of this moderation into financial crisis and severe recession in the last year or two makes it hard to be complacent on this front. The moral here is not that the unprecedented stability that Canada enjoyed for 15 years or so was unrelated to its inflation targeting regime after all. But it does at the very least suggest that we should be cautious about claiming too much here, and hence in relying too heavily on a renewed program to deliver such a happy experience in the future. Other factors have been, and are likely to remain important, and a further careful study of international experience might help reveal just what these are, what their significance is, and what other aspects of Canadian policy might do about them.
Independent • Reasoned • Relevant
And if the success of inflation targeting in Canada has depended on other aspects of the domestic policy environment, this study has argued that there are also good reasons to believe that factors originating abroad can, do, and will affect its performance. Domestic monetary policies in economies linked by trade and capital markets do interact with one another, and their local effects are influenced by what is happening abroad. Though, as we have seen, there are strong arguments that suggest that inflation targeting policies, each adopted for purely domestic reasons and aimed at local goals in fact reinforce one another across national boundaries and produce desirable outcomes, we have also seen that there are theoretical arguments to suggest that even better results can be obtained by active policy co-operation or even outright co-ordination. Though the pursuit of domestic inflation targets is surely made simpler for policymakers if they ignore their currency's exchange rate with that of their major trading partners, it is still perhaps possible that its degree of success cannot be enhanced if the extra complexities associated with incorporating the exchange rate into policy decisions can be mastered. The same goes for the behaviour of asset prices more generally, a particularly pressing consideration in the light of the recent worldwide disruptions that have emanated from those markets. And here too, given the high degree of international integration of such markets, the best response to such issues for one inflation targeting country is unlikely to be independent of measures taken elsewhere. Questions about international cooperation, and perhaps outright policy co-ordination arise once more.
The point of all this, and indeed of this paper in general, is not to offer particular answers to these questions, but it is to argue that they must be addressed and answered explicitly as part of the process leading up to the renewal of Canada's monetary policy regime in 2011. Perhaps, then, the debate up to now has been just a little too parochial for comfort, and perhaps this essay will help to broaden it in a constructive way.
Central bankers of all stripes insist that low and stable inflation is desirable. Therefore, at the most general level, it is unclear what is so special about central banks whose monetary policy strategy carries the label inflation targeting. First, and foremost, central banks in this category are distinguished from others by virtue of the fact that they publicly announce a numerical objective for inflation. The Table  below shows which countries, in both the industrial world and in emerging markets, announced such targets in 2008. 35 Most inflation-targeting central banks actually target the mid-point of a range that is either a zone of tolerance or comfort in view of the fact that there are always shocks to prices that are transitory in nature. Therefore, the degree to which an individual inflation-targeting central bank is happy to allow actual inflation to fluctuate away from the mid-mid-point of any range also varies. Second, by publicly announcing such an objective, normally with the active consent of government, these central banks are expected to be relatively more accountable and transparent than their counterparts; although this is, strictly speaking, not always true as central banks that endorse a variety of monetary policy strategies not referred to as inflation targeting have also become more transparent over the last few years, as the Figure A1 below reveals.
In any event, the fact that an inflation rate over some future horizon is being targeted means that the onus is on the central bank to be forward looking, ordinarily by providing either its own forecast or information about the economy's outlook. Beyond these essential characteristics a closer look at how inflation targeting is organized worldwide reveals a surprising amount of diversity.
For example, some central banks focus their policy on the behaviour of a core measure of inflation although the vast majority follows an objective that is expressed in terms of a headline measure of inflation. Most inflation targeting central banks make decisions in a committee setting but the precise manner these committees are structured, their size, voting procedures, the release information about their deliberations, and how accountable they are for their decisions can vary widely. 36 Again, the Table below provides some of the relevant information. For example, at the Bank of England, individual members of the Monetary Policy Committee are accountable and the Chair (i.e., the Governor) makes the motion which is then voted on. In many central banks there is no government representative on the committee while at other central banks (e.g., Australia, Japan) there is a representative present for the deliberations (normally, non-voting). At still other central banks (e.g., Canada) there is no committee structure in Statutes and, while the Governor is accountable for the monetary policy decision, a committee exists to provide advice. Beyond the committee structure there exists a wide variety of arrangements that define the remit of the central bank to deliver a specified inflation objective. For example, the Bank of Canada's target is reviewed every five years, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand negotiates a new remit following each election. In the UK, the Chancellor instructs the Bank of England to meet a certain objective though there is, of course, consultation with the Governor before Independent • Reasoned • Relevant any announcement is made. In still other countries the target is reviewed or renewed on a more ad hoc basis.
Other differences between central banks emerge when we consider the horizon over which their policies are supposed to keep inflation in check. Whereas there is a rough consensus around the view that changes in the stance of monetary policy take about two years to work their way through an economy's transmission mechanism many central banks rely on the 'medium-term' or 'over the cycle' as a means of communicating their opinion about over what period monetary policy will influence inflation in the desired direction. Finally, whereas it is now common for inflation targeting central banks to rely on an interest rate instrument there are some subtle differences across countries about the precise mechanism used to influence interest rates no doubt in part because of differences in the maturity and structure of financial markets. Nevertheless, of greater interest is the degree to which inflation targeting central banks foreswear any reliance on intervention in foreign exchange markets. At the risk of over-simplifying, inflation targeting central banks in the industrial world are by far the most reluctant to wield this instrument while monetary authorities in emerging markets tend more openly make clear that the buying and selling of foreign exchange remains part of the toolkit in the conduct of monetary policy. 37 
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The Taylor rule and its variants are named after John Taylor who depicted US Federal Reserve Policy as reacting to inflation and output developments. Orphanides (2007) traces the intellectual development of the Taylor rule, which was originally 'calibrated' to the conditions prevailing in the US economy. This means that Taylor (1993) originally assumed that the real interest rate that suited the US economy in the long-run is set at 2 percent, and that the Fed, consistent with its dual mandate, is equally concerned with inflation control and ensuring adequate output and employment. Hence, the Taylor rule is written: i = 2 + + 0.5 * ( 2) + 0.5* (y y * ) where i is the policy rate of the central bank (in the US the fed funds rate), is inflation, and (y y * ) is the amount of aggregate slack in the economy, otherwise known as the output gap.
An alternative way of writing the rule that highlights the role of inflationary shocks in influencing the setting of the policy instrument results in the following expression i = 1.5 * ( 2) + 0.5 * (y y * ) + 4 Given a desired real interest rate of 2 percent, the nominal rate is larger by the amount of inflation. Next, if the central bank has a 2 percent inflation target (implicit in the case of a non inflation targeting central bank like the US Federal Reserve), inflation that exceeds this target triggers a nominal interest rate increase one and half times the amount that inflation exceeds the target. This is the so-called Taylor principle which makes clear that excessive inflation can only be eliminated by effectively raising the real interest rate as this is the signal of a tighter monetary policy. Similarly, in the event the economy is overheating (i.e., y>y * ) then the policy rate would also rise by one half of the amount by which the output gap is positive. In spite of its simplicity Taylor (1993) demonstrates that the rule fits well actual fed funds rate behaviour over the 1987-1992 period. More recently, Poole (2006) shows that a slightly modified rule fits the actual fed funds rate very well over a much longer sample (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Poole, however, is quick to point out that the US Federal Reserve, while seemingly acting as if it follows a rule, does not do so in a slavish fashion as there are several periods when the rule shown above does not match actual fed funds behaviour. Periods of financial stress, for example, prompts the Fed not to act as if it follows a rule. Instead, a Taylor rule is best viewed as a heuristic device for understanding the core ingredients of a monetary policy strategy.
Needless to say the Taylor rule quickly became an enormously popular way of summarizing the essence of the conduct of monetary policy around the world. 38 However, there were several refinements in how economists generated evidence based on the Taylor rule.
First, as pointed out in this article, central banks tend to change the policy instrument directly under their control in a gradual manner. 39 Second, it is not clear that a central bank places the weights on the inflation and output gaps assumed by Taylor. Instead, the weights can be estimated by allowing the expression above to hold with some error together with some allowance for gradual changes in interest rates, known as the interest rate smoothing phenomenon. Indeed, it is not obvious that all central banks either have a 2 percent target or assume a 2 percent real interest rate in mind. This implies a Taylor rule of the form where is the interest rate smoothing parameter, i * and * are the desired real interest rate and inflation target, t identifies time, and identify the size of the response to inflation and output gap shocks, and is an error term. This modified Taylor rule makes clear that this month or this quarter's policy rate is a function of the value set in the last period. Next, as it concerns inflation targeting central banks in particular, it is unclear why the central bank does not instead respond today either to a forecast or some expectation of future inflation and the output gap. Here the time horizon the central bank has in mind comes into play. As a consequence ( * ) is replaced by E t ( t+1 + * ) where E t is the expectation of inflation i periods ahead, conditional on information available at time t. A similar expression could be used to replace the output gap term in the above equations. 40 Since the US is not a small open economy, and there have also been suggestions that central banks ought to react to asset prices, variants of the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing appeared that added an exchange rate or some other variable, such as stock returns. Nevertheless, the broad consensus is that these variables do not belong in a Taylor rule for a variety of empirical and theoretical reasons (see, for example , Clarida 2001; Fuhrer and Tootell 2004) .
Finally, one would be remiss if the distinction between estimated and optimal rules is not briefly discussed. Versions of the Taylor rule discussed above did not make reference to whether the weights, estimated or calibrated, represent the preferences of the central bank, the public, or both. Therefore, without any knowledge of the objective function of the central bank -this describes the preferences of the monetary authority, and the extent to which it values deviations of inflation and the output gap from their respective targetsit is difficult to ascertain whose weights the parameters and refer to. Once the objective function of the monetary authority is defined 41 then one can derive a form of the reaction function that characterizes the weight the central bank actually places on inflation versus output outcomes.
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